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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

*Discussion at  
US 13 Meeting of  
30 June 1959 and  
approved as a  
Special NIE--  
SNIE 36.2/2  
59*

30 June 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Short-Term Outlook in Iraq

1. Concerning the situation in Iraq we now feel that the recent SNIE's have been too gloomy. We are impressed by signs of growing resolve on Qassim's part to move against the Iraqi Communists, and by the increasing strength of his efforts. We now think that Communist control of Iraq is less likely than we thought it was a few weeks ago.
2. This does not mean that the tide has turned finally and irrevocably against the Communists. They almost certainly retain an influential position in government ministries and some army commands. Their power over mass organizations and street mobs has not evaporated. The regime has as yet shown no signs of dissatisfaction with its close ties with and heavy dependence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
3. Any estimate of what will happen next has to be highly tentative. The Soviet Ambassador has left for Moscow for "medical reasons" and the USSR may decide that a tactic of retreat, or of

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temporary accommodation, is now the better part of Communist valor. Indeed, there is a recent report that attempts are being made to work out a united front with the leftist Nationalist Democratic Party. On the other hand, the Communists, whether or not prompted by Moscow, may feel impelled to strike back -- to protect themselves and their position against the reprisals that would be likely if the Nationalists gained dominance.

4. The period between now and the week of 14 July, the first anniversary of the Revolution, promises to be one of intense political maneuvering. Events taking place during this period of popular emotional buildup could easily precipitate a showdown, even if unintentional.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:



SHERMAN KENT  
Assistant Director  
National Estimates

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